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NOTES AND COMMENTS 
Excluding Evidence to Protect Rights: Principles 
Underlying the Exclusionary Rule in England and 
the United States 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution directs that govern-
ment officials respect the right of persons to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures.' In 1914 the Supreme Court held that police must return to the 
accused property which federal agents had seized in violation of this fundamen-
tal guarantee.2 Because the Court ordered the government to return the prop-
erty, the Court effectively barred the prosecution from using it as evidence at the 
accused's criminal trial.3 The Supreme Court subsequently expanded the scope 
of this exclusionary rule 4 and extended the rule to state violations of the fourth 
amendment in 1961.5 
Recently, however, members of the Burger Court have increasingly urged 
reconsideration of the exclusionary rule and the Reagan Administration has 
I. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The amendment reads in full: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Except where stated, this Comment is concerned chiefly with the application of the exclusionary rule 
to illegal searches and seizures. The Supreme Court has also applied the exclusionary rule to "brutal" 
denials of due process, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); confessions, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966); police lineups, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); identifications, Gilbert v. 
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); and denials of the right to counsel, Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 
(1977). 
2. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). In this case the Supreme Court extensively reviewed 
authorities which considered fourth amendment protection to be "fundamental." Id. at 390-92. The 
exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment may have had its origins in Buyd v. 
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1885), in which the Supreme Court analogized violations of fourth 
amendment rights to instances of compulsory self-incrimination which courts had excluded under the 
fifth amendment. 
3. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,393,398 (1914). 
4. See generally Bernardi, The Exclusionary Rule: Is a Good Faith Standard Needed to Preserve a Liberal 
Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 30 DE PAUL L. REv. 51 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Bernardi]. 
American courts have popularly adopted the term "exclusionary rule" to refer to the mandatory 
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
5. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 643. 
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proposed that Congress narrow its SCOpe.6 Furthermore, the Supreme Court and 
the Reagan Administration have attacked the exclusionary rule without ade-
quately addressing strong arguments that the exclusionary rule is constitution-
ally required7 and without forwarding alternative remedies that would effec-
tively protect fundamental rights. 8 Critics of the push for a weaker exclusionary 
rule have noted that the Court's recent reliance on the deterrence principle9 to 
guide its development of the exclusionary rule prevents the resolution of basic 
issues central to the present debate concerning the proper scope of the exclusion-
ary rule. lo These critics suggest that a need exists to determine the basic 
principles, if any, that justify the use of an exclusionary remedy for violation of 
fundamental rights. I I 
Some recent studies of the exclusionary rule suggest that legal scholars may 
best determine the basic principles underlying the proper exercise of that rem-
edy through analysis ofthe exclusionary rules of other legal systemsP Reference 
to state experience proves futile because the states are no longer free to fashion 
their own remedies for violations of fourth amendment rights. 13 Foreign legal 
systems, therefore, offer the best comparison to the present conflict over the 
American exclusionary rule. Comparison of the American and English exclusion-
ary rules is particularly appropriate. The legal institutions of both nations share 
6. See § V. B infra. 
7. See § V.D. 2 infra. 
8. See § V.D. I infra. 
9. For the definition of the deterrence and other rationales for the exclusion of evidence, see note II 
infra. 
10. Sunderland, Liberals, Conservatives and the Exclusionary Rule, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMIN. 343 (1980) 
[hereinafter cited as Sunderland]. Sunderland notes that defenses of the deterrence principle can be 
characterized as abandoning "considerations of constitutional principle." Id. See also Schlesinger & 
Wilson, Property, Privacy and Deterrence: The Exclusionary Rule in Search of a Rationale, 18 DUQ. L. REV. 
225 (1980) and authorities cited at n. I, p. 225 therein; Spector & Foster, Swords, Shields, and the Questfor 
Truth in the Trial Process: The Road from Constitutional Standards to Evilientiary Havens, 33 OKLA. L. REv. 520 
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Spector & Foster]; Note, Moving to Suppress the Exciusinnary Rule: The Use of 
Ilkgally Obtained Evidence as the Basis for Probabk Cause, 60 B.U.L. REv. 713 (1980); Note, Michigan v. 
DeFillippo: Time to Resolve the Confusinn Surrounding the Fourth Amendment Exciusinnary Ruk, 7 OHIO 
N.U.L. REv. 170 (1980). 
II. See, e.g., Sunderland, supra note 10, at 343-44. 
Sunderland has criticized and contrasted the various justifications put forth for the exclusionary rule. 
Thesejustifications include judicial integrity, iii. at 348 (failures of the government, as moral leader, to 
act with integrity would influence citizens to do likewise); deterrence, iii. at 351 (exclusion of evidence 
removes incentive to violate rights); constitutional necessity, iii. at 368 (a constitutional government may 
not gain by disregarding those basic individuals rights which define the limits of its sovereign power); 
and the exclusionary rule as a requirement of judicial review, iii. at 373 (the role of the courts in the 
United States as protectors of fundamental rights requires exclusion of certain evidence). 
12. Katz, Rejlectinns on Search and Seizure and Ilkgally Seized Evidence in Canada and the United States, 3 
CAN.-U.S. L.J. 103, 103-09 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Katz]; Pattenden, The Exclusion of Unfairly 
Obtained Evidence in England, Canada and Australia, 29 INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 664 (1980) [hereinafter cited 
as Pattenden]. 
13. See note 5 and accompanying text supra. 
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a common law heritage. 14 Furthermore, a significant controversy in England 
concerning recent attempts to restrict that nation's exclusionary rule has gener-
ated much discussion about the proper role of the exclusionary rule in a demo-
cratic society.ls Finally, English courts consistently apply the exclusionary rule to 
evidence which police obtain in violation of basic rights. 16 The princi pie underly-
ing this practice may conflict with the deterrence principle which directs the 
application of the American exclusionary rule. 17 
This Comment will first trace the historical development in England of the 
judicial discretion to exclude certain types of illegally obtained evidence. The 
author will then examine the culmination of this common law development, the 
1979 decision of the House of Lords in R. v. Sang. 18 This Comment will further 
address the effects that a recently proposed statutory reform of the law of 
criminal procedure l9 may have on the English exclusionary rule. Finally, the 
author will compare the theoretical principles which underlie the American and 
English exclusionary rules. This Comment concludes that the principle which 
guides each nation's exclusionary rule reflects the government's determination 
to effectively protect fundamental rights. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO EXCLUDE RELEVANT 
EVIDENCE 
A. The Discretion to Exclude Evidence 
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, English courts regarded 
the method of obtaining evidence to be irrelevant to its admissibility.20 There-
fore, those tribunals gave little comment to the issue of the admissibility of the 
fruits of illegal searches and seizures.21 In fact, the 1870 case of Jones v. Owen22 is 
the only English decision reported before 1955 that treats the issue of admissibil-
ity of illegally obtained evidence.23 InJones, an improper search of the defen-
14. See generally Chafee, Book Review, 57 HARV. L. REv. 399, 411-22) 1944) (reviewing DELAWARE 
CASES, 1792-1830 (D. Boorstin ed. 1943)). 
15. See §§ III-IV infra. 
16. See § V.A infra. 
17. See § V infra. 
18. 1980 A.C. 402. 
19. THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, REpORT, CMD. No. 8092 (1981) [hereinafter 
cited as ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT]. 
20. Weinberg, The judicial Discretinn to Exclude Relevant Evidence, 21 MCGILL L.J. I, 13 (1975) 
[hereinafter cited as Weinberg]. Justice Crompton declared in an 1861 case that "it maUers not how you 
get it; if you steal it even, it would be admissible in evidence." R. v. Leatham, 8 Cox C.C. 498, 50 I. The 
case is officially reported at 121 Eng. Rep. 589 (Q.B. 1861); however, that report does not contain the 
quoted comment. 
21. Weinberg, supra note 20, at 13. 
22. [1870] 34 J.P. 759. 
23. Williams, Evidence Obtained by Jlkgal Means, 1955 CRIM. L. REv. 339, 343-44 [hereinafter cited as 
Williams]. 
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dant's person produced twenty-five illegally caught salmon.24 The court found 
that exclusion of the evidence would impose a "dangerous obstacle" to the court's 
duty to weigh all relevant evidence and held the salmon to be admissible.25 
In the early twentieth century, English courts gradually developed a form of 
judicial discretion to exclude certain types of evidence, such as character evi-
dence,26 admissions27 and similar act evidence.28 The courts based the discretion 
to exclude these types of evidence on the theory that traditional rules of admissi-
bility should not govern evidence of little probative value because admission of 
that evidence might unfairly prejudice the jury.29 Similarly, some courts ex-
cluded illegally obtained confessions on the grounds that such statements were 
unreliable.30 In the 1941 case of R. v. Barker,31 the High Court of Justice, King's 
Bench Division, excluded from evidence an accountant's records which the 
government had improperly obtained by making false promises of immunity.32 
Although the court referred to the confession cases, the basis for the exclusion of 
the accountant's records was not reliability, since the records were apparently 
reliable.33 The court also did not characterize the evidence as prejudicial.34 
24. [1870] 34 J.P. 759. 
25. Id. at 760. While criminal cases rarely restated this rule of admitting all relevant evidence, the 
dicta of many civil cases reflected the wide acceptance of that principle. Stockfleth v. DeTastet, 171 Eng. 
Rep. 4 (K.B. 1814); Lloyd v. Mostyn, 152 Eng. Rep. 558 (Ex. 1842); Calcraft v. Guest, [1898] 1 Q. B. 
759; Ashburton v. Pape, [1913] 2 Ch. 469. See also R. v. Inhabitants of Eriswell, 100 Eng. Rep. 815, 818 
(K.B. 1790). 
26. See, e.g., R. v. Watson, 8 Crim. App. 249 (1913). Character evidence consists of assertions of a 
witness as to the reputation or bad acts of a party, or as to the witness' personal opinion of the party's 
disposition. R. CROSS, EVIDENCE 268, 304 (2nd ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as CROSS]. English courts 
probably derived the discretion to exclude character evidence from interpretation of the Criminal 
Evidence Act of 1898 § 1(f). Weinberg, supra note 20, at 16. 
27. See, e.g., R. v. Christie, 1914 A.C. 545. Admissions are statements adverse to the maker's case 
which, when made to a person in authority, are admissible only if voluntarily proferred. CROSS, supra 
note 26, at 423; Weinberg, supra note 20, at 23·24. 
28. See, e.g., Noor Mohamed v. R., 1949 A.C. 182 (P.C.) (Brit. Guiana); Harris v. D.P.P., 1952 A.C. 
694. Similar act (also termed similar fact) evidence is evidence of disposition or tendency to act, feel or 
think in some usual way. CROSS, supra note 26, at 267·70; see Weinberg, supra note 20, at 14-15. 
29. See R. v. Sang, 1980 A.C. 402, 434-37, in which Lord Diplock reviewed the common law on this 
point from R. v. Christie, 1914 A.C. 545, through Kuruma v. The Queen, 1955 A.C. 197 (P.c.) (Eastern 
Afr.). 
This Comment adopts the popular term "prejudicial evidence" to refer to evidence which a jury is 
likely to consider more important than the actual probative value of the evidence would justify. See 
CROSS, supra note 26, at 12·23. 
30. See Williams, supra note 23. at 339·43; Weinberg. supra note 20. at 19·22; Andrews. Involuntary 
Confessions and Illegally Obtained Evidence in Criminal Cases·I, 1963 CRIM. L. REv. 15. 18.20 [hereinafter 
cited as Andrews]. Courts describe evidence obtained through involuntary confessions as unreliable 
when the circumstances surrounding the confession give rise to doubts about the truthfulness of the 
procured statements. CROSS. supra note 26. at 260·63. 
31. [1941] 2 K.B. 381. 
32. Id. at 381·82. 
33. /d. at 384. See Williams. supra note 23. at 341. 
34. R. v. Barker. [1941] 2 K.B. 384-85. The Court did not discuss the probative value of the evidence. 
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Thus, Barker was the first case in which an English court excluded reliable and 
non-prejudicial evidence, although the basis of the decision is not readily appar-
ent.3S 
B. Expanding the Scope of the Discretion: The Kuruma Decision 
An English court first expressly applied the discretion to exclude relevant 
evidence to fruits of an illegal search and seizure in K uruma v. The Queen. 36 In 
Kuruma, an unauthorized officer searched the defendant in the then British 
province of Kenya.37 The search disclosed that the defendant was carrying two 
rounds of ammunition in violation of a war-time regulation.3s The prosecution 
introduced the ammunition at the defendant's criminal trial, after which the 
presiding magistrate convicted the defendant and sentenced him to death.39 The 
Privy Council40 denied Kuruma's appeal and held that illegally obtained evi-
dence was admissible if at all relevant. 41 However, in dicta, the Council stated: 
No doubt in a criminal case the judge always has a discretion to 
disallow evidence if the strict rules of admissibility would operate 
unfairly against an accused.. . . If, for instance, some admission of 
some piece of evidence, e.g., a document, had been obtained from a 
defendant by a trick, no doubt the judge might properly rule it OUt. 42 
At this point the Council referred to two cases which involved the exclusion of 
prejudicial evidence.43 Thus, the Privy Council appeared to be merely restating 
the discretion English courts had developed in the areas of character and similar 
act evidence, admissions and confessions,44 and not broadening that discretion to 
include the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. However, the Council's use 
of the document example reveals that in determining the admissibility of evi-
35. See Williams, supra note 23, at 341-42. "From this review [of Barker] it will be seen that the basic 
position of English law in relation to the admissibility of evidence is not clearly or consistently worked 
out." [d. at 342. 
36. 1955 A.C. 197 (P.C.) (Eastern Afr.). 
37. [d. at 198-99, 202-03. 
38. [d. at 198, 202. 
39. /d. at 198. 
40. The judicial Committee of the Privy Council is the highest court of appeal in the British 
Commonwealth. However, the individual countries of the Commonwealth may abolish the right of 
appeal to the Council and most countries have now done so. Furthermore, the decisions of the Privy 
Council are advisory and "persuasive" only and are not binding on the lower courts. P. JAMES, 
INTRODUCTION TO ENGUSH LAW 37-38 (9th ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as JAMES]. 
41. Kuruma v. The Queen, 1955 A.C. at 203. For a discussion of relevance as a necessary aspect of all 
admissible evidence, see CROSS, supra note 26, at 12-23. 
42. Kuruma v. The Queen, 1955 A.C. at 204. 
43. [d. The Privy Council referred to NoOT Mohamed v. R., 1949 A.C. 182 (P.C.) ( Brit. Guiana) and 
Harris v. D.P.P., 1952 A.C. 694. See note 28 supra. 
44. See notes 26-30 and accompanying text supra. 
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dence, the Council placed emphasis not on the prosecution's use of that evidence 
at trial but on the method by which police had obtained the evidence.45 
The Kuruma court also referred to the exclusion of confessions of doubtful 
truthfulness. 46 However, the reliability principle which underlies the exclusion 
of illegal confessions does not justify the exclusion of a document of unques-
tioned probative value.47 Furthermore, the Council did not mention R. v. 
Barker,48 decided fourteen years earlier, although that case may have supported 
the establishment of a discretion to exclude documents police illegally seize from 
an accused.49 Finally, one English decision interpreted the dicta in Kuruma as 
establishing a general discretion to exclude all illegally obtained evidence,5° but 
again the Privy Council failed to cite any authority for such a discretionary 
power.51 
C. Attempts to Interpret the Kuruma Decision 
Legal commentators criticized the Privy Council for failing to cite authority for 
its extension of the discretion to exclude illegally obtained evidence in the 
Kuruma dicta. 52 Despite both that failure and the ambiguity in the Kuruma 
opinion, English courts considered the dicta used by the Privy Council as jus-
tification for greatly expanding the scope of the judicial discretion to exclude 
relevant evidence.53 For instance, courts interpreted the Kuruma decision as 
directing the continued exclusion of illegally obtained confessions on the basis of 
the reliability principle.54 An English court also cited the Kuruma opinion in a 
case which firmly established the discretion to exclude prejudicial evidence in 
order to secure the accused a fair trial. 55 Some English decisions went even 
further, extending the discretion to other types of evidence, such as evidence the 
police had procured through entrapment, fruits of illegal searches and seizures, 
and evidence the state had obtained from the person himself.56 
English courts subjected evidence which police had procured by means of 
entrapment to a number of contradictory holdings. In a few cases, the courts 
45. See generaUy R. v. Sang, 1980 A.C. 402, 434-37. 
46. Kuruma v. The Queen, 1955 A.C. at 205. 
47. See Williams, supra note 23, at 341. 
48. R. v. Barker, [1941] 2 K.B. 381. 
49. R v. Sang, 1980 A.C. at 434-35. 
50. The High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, adopted this position in Callis v. Gunn, 
[1964] 1 Q.B. 495, 502. 
51. Kuruma v. The Queen, 1955 A.C. at 204-05. 
52. Williams, supra note 23, at 344; Andrews, supra note 30, at 16-18; Heydon, lUegally Obtained 
Evidence (2), 1973 CRIM. L. REv. 690, 695-99. 
53. See notes 54-74 and accompanying text infra. 
54. See Andrews, supra note 30, at 15-20; Editor's Note, Subjective Tests of the Voluntanness of 
Confessions. 1979 CRIM. L. REv. 337. See also note 30 and accompanying text supra. 
55. Selvey v. D.P.P .• 1970 A.C. 304. 
56. See notes 57-74 and accompanying text infra. 
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refused to extend the Kuruma dicta to evidence improperly obtained through 
entrapment."7 In another case, while admitting evidence procured by means of 
entrapment, the court mitigated the defendant's sentence because of the im-
proper police cond uct. 58 In four other cases, the courts recognized a discretion 
to exclude this type of improperly obtained evidence; the trial court exercised 
the discretion in three of the cases59 but not in the fourth. 60 
Courts also had difficulty applying the Kuruma dicta to evidence police had 
discovered by means of illegal searches and seizures. The High Court of Justice, 
Queen's Bench Division, ruled in Callis v. Gunn that evidence the state had 
obtained "in an oppressive manner by force or against the wishes of an accused" 
could be subject to the exclusionary discretion. 61 The Court refused to exclude 
fingerprints which the police had taken without informing the accused that he 
could refuse to give them,62 but did suggest that courts exclude all evidence 
which police might obtain by false representations, tricks, threats or bribes.63 In 
R. v. Payne, 64 the Court of Criminal Appeal held that the trialjudge should have 
excluded results of sobriety tests which a doctor had administered to the defen-
dant at the police station because the defendant consented to the tests only after 
the police falsely promised that they would not use the results in any prosecution 
for driving under the influence. 65 One author criticized the Payne decision, 
contending that trial courts should exclude only prejudicial evidence. According 
to this argument, the Court of Criminal Appeal should not have excluded the 
results of the medical examination because the results were of definite probative 
value. 66 
57. R. v. McEvilly, 60 Crim. App. 150 (1973); R. v. Mealey, 60 Crim. App. 59 (1974). 
58. R. v. Birtles, [1969) I W.L.R. 1047. 
59. R. v. Foulder, 1973 Crim. L. Rev. 45; R. v. Burnett, 1973 Crim. L. Rev. 748; R. v. Ameer, 1977 
Crim. L. Rev. 104. These cases are reported only in the Criminal Law Review. 
60. R. v. Willis, 1976 Crim. L. Rev. 127. This case is reported only in the Criminal Law Review. 
61. [1964) I Q.B. 495, 501. 
62. /d. 
63. /d. at 502. Lord Parker distinguished the failure to caution from instances of trickery or 
oppression by indicating that a failure to caution involves no misrepresentation of the defendant's 
rights, while trickery and oppression serve to force or confuse the defendant into consenting to a 
violation of his personal rights. 
/d. 
But in the present case it is to be observed that whatever the defendant knew about the law and 
his rights, the police never misrepresented it to him .... [W]hat the justices say is not that the 
police represented that he had to accede, but that they did not make it sufficiently clear that he 
had any right to refuse. 
64. [1963] I W.L.R. 637. 
65. [d. at 638. The Court placed great weight on the case of R. v. Court reported in 1962 CRIM. L. 
REv. 697, which was described as "almost identical" with Payne. R. v. Payne, [1963] I W.L.R. 637, 638. 
66. Livesey, Judicial Discretinn to Exclude Prejudicial Evidence, 26 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 291, 309 (1968) 
[hereinafter cited as Livesey]. Livesey aptly characterized the post-Kuruma extensions of the discretion 
to exclude evidence into areas other than prej udicial evidence by titling his section on those develop-
ments "Confusion in the Law." /d. at 302. However, Livesey apparently did not discuss the difference 
between the Callis consent to fingerprinting (see note 61 supra) and the Payne consent to a medical 
140 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. VI, No.1 
In the 1978 case of Jeffrey v. Black,67 which the House of Lords termed the 
"high water mark of this kind of illegality,"68 the defendant's arrest for stealing a 
sandwich led police to search the defendant's apartment for drugs.69 The trial 
judge found that the warrantless search was illegal and therefore excluded 
evidence which police had seized during the search. 70 The High Court of Justice, 
Queen's Bench Division, reversed, holding that relevant evidence was generally 
admissible71 and that the judicial discretion to exclude illegally obtained evidence 
should be exercised only in "rare" and "exceptional" cases. 72 According to the 
Court, those exceptional cases were ones in which the police had more than 
merely broken a technical rule of criminal procedure. 73 For instance, the Court 
stated that: 
If the case is such that not only have the police officers entered 
without authority, but they have been guilty of trickery or they have 
misled someone, or they have been oppressive or they have been 
unfair, or in other respects they have behaved in a manner which is 
morally reprehensible, then it is open to the justices to apply their 
discretion .... 74 
Therefore, while the Kuruma case marked an expansion of the judicial discre-
tion to exclude relevant evidence, English courts struggled to interpret the 
Kuruma dicta and were unable to clearly define the scope of that power. On one 
hand, the courts increasingly looked to the means by which the police had 
obtained the evidence in order to evaluate its admissibility.75 On the other hand, 
the decisions of these tribunals failed to settle the issue of what means are so 
improper as to require the exclusion of evidence. The Kuruma andJeffrey v. Black 
cases seemed to indicate that a mere technical violation of criminal proced ure 
should not result in the exclusion of evidence. 76 The Callis v. Gunn and Jeffrey v. 
examination (see note 65 supra). See Livesey, supra, at 300 n. 47. The discussion of evidence obtained 
"from the accused" in R. v. Sang, 1980 A.C. 402, 434-437, would now likely govern the admissibility of 
both fingerprints and the results of medical examinations. See § IIl.B infra and especially note 115 
therein. 
67. [1978] I Q.B. 490. 
68. R. v. Sang, 1980 A.C. at 435. 
69. Jeffrey v. Black, [1978] I Q.B. 490, 495-96. 
70. [d. at 492. The trial court also found, as the prosecution had contended, that the defendant did 
not consent to the search. [d. 
71. [d. at 497, quoting the Kuruma dicta reprinted in the text accompanying note 42 supra. 
72. Jeffrey v. Black, [1978] I Q.B. at 498. 
73. [d. The Court does not make clear what the result would have been had the police obtained a 
warrant. See id. at 496-97. 
74. [d. at 498. 
75. See note 66 and accompanying text supra. 
76. See notes 42, 73-74 and accompanying text supra. In Kuruma the Privy Council affirmed the 
defendant's conviction and held the illegal search to be not grounds for reversal. See text accompanying 
note 41 supra. 
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Black decisions listed many forms of impropriety that would generally constitute 
more than mere technicalities. 77 While the Kuruma decision stated that a trial 
judge "always" has discretion to exclude such improperly obtained evidence,78 
Jeffrey v. Black would limit the use of the discretion to "rare" and "exceptional" 
cases. 79 Furthermore, although entrapment does involve a measure of trickery, 
entrapment cases are not considered "rare,"80 and the courts have reached a 
number of conflicting decisions in those cases. 81 Finally, R. v. Payne and R. v. 
Barker involved evidence which the police obtained by making false promises to 
the defendant. In both cases, the court based its decision on an analogy to the 
confession cases although the reliability of the evidence was not at issue. 82 
In 1973 one legal scholar summarized his analysis of these developments in his 
statement that the discretionary power "derives from miscellaneous and diverse 
sources" and "is obscure in its origins, difficult to state, and the subject of a 
volume of dissent from several points of view."83 The House of Lords also 
recognized that trial judges and advocates were "anxious for guidance as to 
whether the discretion really is so wide as these imprecise expressions would 
seem to suggest. ... "84 The case of R. v. Sang, 85 decided by the House of Lords in 
1979,86 addressed this need for guidance. 
III. ApPLYING THE DISCRETION TO VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO SILENCE: THE 
SANG DECISION 
A. The R. v. Sang Decision 
In R. v. Sang 87 the Court of Appeal88 put to the House of Lords the narrow 
question of whether a trial judge could properly exclude evidence which police 
77. See notes 63 & 74 and accompanying text supra. 
78. See note 42 and accompanying text supra. 
79. See note 72 and accompanying text supra. 
80. See text accompanying notes 57-60 supra. 
81. Id. 
82. See notes 33 & 64 and accompanying text supra. 
83. Heydon, Illegally Obtained Evidence (I), 1973 CRIM. L. REv. 603. 
84. R. v. Sang, 1980 A.C. at 431. 
85. 1980 A.C. 402. 
86. The House of Lords, although technically a committee of the upper chamber of the parliamen-
tary body of the same name, is in practice the court of highest appeal in England and separate from 
Parliament. The nine Lords sitting on this Court hear appeals from the courts of appeal only when 
those courts certify points oflaw of general importance for the House to consider. See JAMES, supra note 
40, at 36-37. 
87. 1980 A.C. 402. 
88. The Court of Appeal consists of the Civil and Criminal Divisions. The Criminal Division hears 
appeals from trials conducted in the Crown Court, which cond ucts the trials of all indictable offenses. 
Convicted defendants have a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal on questions of law and the Court 
may also give leave for appeal on questions the trial judge has certified. See JAMES, supra note 40, at 
34-36. In Sang, the defendant had exercised his right to appeal to the Court of Appeal, and the Court of 
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had gained through entrapment. 89 The House of Lords unanimously found that 
the defense of entrapment did not exist in English law and that a court had no 
discretion to exclude relevant evidence merely because police had obtained it 
through entrapment.90 However, the Court of Appeal, noting the importance of 
the evidentiary issues involved,91 had also certified a much broader question92 
for consideration by the House: "Does a trial judge have a discretion to refuse to 
allow evidence - being evidence other than evidence of admission - to be given 
in any circumstances in which such evidence is relevant and of more than 
minimal probative value?"93 Although no rule required the five Law Lords to 
decide the certified question, Lord Diplock urged his fellow Lords to answer the 
question in its full breadth in order to dispose of the "imprecise expressions" that 
had for too long guided the lower courtsY4 
After discussing the cases which established the discretion to exclude relevant 
evidence,95 Lord Diplock concluded that a trial judge has the discretion to 
exclude two types of evidence. 96 First, a judge may exclude evidence when its 
prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value. 97 Second, the judge has the 
general discretion to exclude confessions, admissions and other evidence police 
obtain "from the accused" after the commission of the offense.9s However, all 
other evidence, even that obtained by improper or unfair means, cannot be 
subject to the exclusionary discretion.99 
B. The Bases fOT the Exclusion of Evidence in Sang 
Lord Diplock derived these conclusions from the principles which justify the 
exclusion of evidence. Diplock stated that discipline of prosecutors or police for 
Appeal subsequently certified a question to the House of Lords. R. v. Sang, 1980 A.C. at 424-25. See also 
note 86 supra. 
89. R. v. Sang, 1980 A.C. at 430-31. 
90. !d. at 433, 441, 443, 446, 454-55. For a full discussion of the Sang decision as to entrapment per 
se, see Heydon, Entrapment and Unfairly Obtained Evidence in the House of Lords, 1980 CRIM. L. REv. 129 
[hereinafter cited as Heydon, Entrapment]. 
91. R. v. Sang, 1980 A.C. at 430-31. See Lord Scarman's comment noting that the certified question 
raised "profound issues in the administration of criminal justice." [d. at 450. 
92. Professor Heydon considered the breadth of the certified question to be "extraordinary." 
Heydon, Entrapment, supra note 90, at 129. Heydon also notes that this breadth necessarily requires the 
answer to the question to be in large part dicta. !d. However, the Lords themselves acknowledged this 
fact. R. v. Sang, 1980 A.C. at 431-32, 456. 
93. R. v. Sang, 1980 A.C. at 431. 
94. Id. at 431-32. 
95. Id. at 434-36. Lord Diplock gave special attention to the Kuruma (see note 36 supra), Barker (see 
note 31 supra) and Payne (see note 64 supra) cases. !d. 
96. R. v. Sang, 1980 A.C. at 437. 
97. !d. 
98. Id. In the summary of his answer to the certified question, Lord Diplock referred to the type of 
evidence which he analogizes to confessions as evidence "from the accused."!d. This Comment uses 
that term to refer to that type of non-prejudicial evidence which Diplock considered to be subject to the 
exclusionary rule. However, Dip10ck did not make clear what factual situations he intended to refer to 
by those words. See note 115 infra. 
99. [d. 
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their illegal acts in obtaining evidence should not be a factor in determining the 
admissibility of evidence. loo Instead, the trial judge should determine whether 
exclusion of evidence is necessary to secure the accused a fair triaJ.1Ol Diplock 
stated that a trialjudge always has the discretion to exclude prejudicial evidence 
for this purposel02 and further noted that trial courts had developed the discre-
tion to exclude such prejudicial evidence into a "general rule of practice."103 
Diplock then addressed the varied interpretations of the Kuruma dicta which 
had caused the expansion of the discretion to exclude relevant evidence. l04 
Diplock noted that in the two cases in which lower courts had actually excluded 
non prejudicial evidence, the police had improperly obtained the excluded evi-
dence from the defendant himself.1 05 In Barkerl06 the police tricked the defen-
dant into providing the prosecution with an incriminating documentl07 and in 
Payne lOB the police misled the defendant into submitting to a medical examina-
tion which provided evidence of his guilt. I 09 Lord Di plock stressed the similarity 
between the example the House of Lords used in the Kuruma case and the Barker 
facts: in both instances the police had obtained a document from the defendant 
by deceptive means. I1O 
Lord Diplock declared that the Privy Council in Kuruma had intended to 
formulate not a general discretion to exclude all improperly obtained evidence 
but only a discretion to exclude that evidence wrongly obtained from the defen-
dant himself.l1l According to Diplock, this discretion to exclude evidence im-
properly obtained "from the accused"112 is analogous to the practice of exclud-
ing confessions and admissions which the state has improperly obtained from 
100. Id. at 436. Lord Diplock stressed the availability of a civil remedy and the action of disciplinary 
authorities in making this assertion. Id. See also notes 275-76 and accompanying text infra, on the 
effectiveness of these alternative remedies. However, many critics of the exclusionary rule have argued 
that use of the exclusionary rule fails to discipline police in instances of good faith conduct, as well as 
when the arresting or searching officer is not particularly concerned with obtaining a conviction. 
Sunderland, supra note 10, at 355. Sunderland follows the common practice of phrasing the issue of 
police discipline in terms of deterrence of police misconduct. /d. at 351-60. For a discussion of the 
deterrence justification for the exclusionary rule, see note 256 and accompanying text infra; Sunder-
mand, supra note 10, at 351-53, 355-60. 
101. R. v. Sang, 1980 A.C. at 436. 
102. Id. at 436-37. For a discussion of the use of the term "prejudicial," see note 29 supra. 
103. R. v. Sang, 1980 A.C. at 434. 
104. See text accompanying note 42 supra. 
105. R. v. Sang, 1980 A.C. at 435. 
106. [1941] 2 K.B. 381. 
107. See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra. 
108. [1963] 1 W.L.R. 637. 
109. Id. at 638. 
110. R. v. Sang, 1980 A.C. at 435. 
111. Id. at 435-36. 
112. Id. at 437. See note 98 supra. 
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accused personsY3 However, evidence not obtained "from the accused" but 
rather "discovered as the result of an illegal search,"114 is not analogous to a 
confession and, therefore, should not be excluded by a trial judge.lls 
113. R. v. Sang, 1980 A.C. at 435-36. 
114. [d. at 436. 
115. [d. at 436-37. Lord Diplock purported to strictly define that evidence which a trial judge may 
exclude. See notes 97-99 and accompanying text supra. However, none of the Law Lords made clear in 
any part of the Sang opinion when, if ever, a trial judge may properly exclude fruits of an illegal search 
or seizure by exercising the stated discretion. For the most part, however, the two branches of the 
discretionary power, the discretion to exclude prejudicial evidence and the discretion to exclude 
evidence improperly obtained "from the accused," seem to allow the exclusion of evidence other than 
the type police generally obtain by means of searches and seizures. 
English courts have traditionally associated the guarantee of a fair trial, secured in part by the 
exclusion of prejudicial evidence, with the discretion to exclude that evidence which would operate 
unfairly at the trial itself, rather than with evidence which police have unfairly obtained. R. v. Sang, 
1980 A.C. at 436. Therefore, evidence which police have obtained by improper means would be subject 
to this discretion to exclude prejudicial evidence only if the evidence had little probative value, was 
misleading, or was otherwise prejudicial. See note 29 supra. Three of the concurring Lords in Sang did 
admit to favoring some broader discretion to exclude other evidence tending to deny the accused a fair 
trial. R. v. Sang, 1980 A.C. at 444-45, 447, 453-54. However, "the conceptofa fair trial is not elucidated 
by their lordships and remains obscure." R. v. Adams, 1980 CRIM. L. REv. 53, 54, comment. The leading 
Australian case, Bunning v. Cross, criticized the use of "fairness" as the basis of a decision to exclude 
evidence. 141 C.L.R. 54 (Ausl. 1977-1978). 
"Fair" or "unfair" is largely meaningless when considering fingerprint evidence obtained by 
force or a trick or even the evidence of possession of, say, explosives or weapons obtained by an 
unlawful search of body or baggage, aided by electronic scanners. There is no initial presump-
tion that the State by its law enforcement agencies, will in the use of such measures of crime 
detection observe some given code of good sportsmanship or chivalry. 
[d. at 75. See also Heydon, Entrapment, supra note 90, at 134-35. 
The Sang opinions also leave unsettled the practical application of the discretion to exclude evidence 
which police have improperly obtained "from the accused." Lord Diplock does declare that "there is no 
discretion to exclude evidence discovered as the result of an illegal search but there is discretion to 
exclude evidence which the accused has been induced to produce voluntarily if the method of induce-
ment was unfair." R. v. Sang, 1980 A.C. at 436. Yet, while Viscount Dilhorne and Lords Salmon, Fraser 
and Scarman all concurred in Diplock's answer to the certified question, this apparent unanimity may 
actually be somewhat illusory. Critics have suggested that due to the broad scope of the certified question 
and the fact that the opinions were in large part dicta, each Lord was able to express satisfaction with 
Diplock's formulation of the exclusionary discretion while reserving judgment on the limits of that 
discretion. Heydon, entrapment, supra note 90, at 132-34; Pattenden, supra note 12, at 666-67; Note, 
Criminal Law -Evidence -Defence of Entrapment -Discretion to Exclude Evidence, 58 CANADIAN B. REV. 
376, 386 (1980). Heydon notes that the Lords may have felt compelled to express a consensus because 
of the recognized need for the establishment of a clear standard to be used by the lower courts. Heydon, 
Entrapment, supra note 90, at 133. See also text accompanying note 84 supra. Viscount Dilhorne alone 
seems to have completely agreed with Lord Diplock and in fact may have provided the phrasing of 
Diplock's answer to the certified question. Pattenden, supra note 12, at 666. Lords Salmon and Scarman, 
on the other hand, placed heavy emphasis on the overriding nature of the judge's duty to ensure a fair 
trial and were, therefore, reluctant to place any limits on the trial judge'S exclusionary discretion. R. v. 
Sang, 1980 A.C. at 444-45, 453; Heydon, Entrapment, supra note 90, at 132-33. Lord Fraser, also hesitant 
to declare any firm limits on the judge'S ability to ensure fairness, R. v. Sang, 1980 A.C. at 449, expressly 
included evidence that police obtained "from premises occupied by [the accused]" in his interpretation 
of Diplock's response. [d. at 450; Heydon, Entrapment, supra note 90, at 133. Heydon has suggested that 
one may infer from these less than enthusiastic concurrences in the letter, ifnot the spirit, of Diplock's 
opinion that the law governing the discretionary power of trial judges to exclude fruits of illegal 
searches and seizures remains unsettled. [d. at 135. 
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This analogy between confessions and physical evidence which the police have 
obtained from the defendant through improper inducement cannot rest on the 
reliability principle,116 however. English courts have traditionally excluded ille-
gally obtained confessions on the basis of their questionable reliability.117 In 
contrast, physical evidence which police have improperly obtained "from the 
accused," that is, evidence which the police have wrongly induced the defendant 
to surrender to the state,"8 may be extremely reliable. For example, the court 
did not question the reliability of the accountant's records in Barkerl19 or the 
results of the medical examination in Payne. 120 Yet Lord Diplock derived his 
analogy between the exclusion of evidence improperly obtained "from the ac-
cused" and the reliability-based exclusion of illegal confessions from the Barker 
and Payne cases. 121 
Some commentators seized upon this apparent inconsistency, criticizing Lord 
Diplock's holding that courts should exclude clearly reliable evidence on the 
basis of what appears to be the reliability principle.122 However, this criticism is 
Despite these uncertainties, a lower court has interpreted the Sang decision as standing for the 
proposition that a trialjudge may properly exclude evidence which the state has seized directly from the 
defendant himself by illegal means. In R. v. Trump, a constable demanded, under the wrong provisions 
of the Road Traffic Act of 1972, a blood sample from a man suspected of driving under the influence of 
alcohol. 70 Crim. App. 300, 301 (1979). The defendant appealed from his conviction, claiming that the 
police had improperly obtained the blood sample and that the trial court should have therefore 
excluded it. /d. The Court of Appeal first noted that the House of Lords, in Sang, had failed to fully 
consider the practical application of the "from the accused" standard. /d. at 302. However, the Court 
interpreted the Sang decision as approving the exclusion of evidence in cases such as Payne, where police 
had improperly obtained evidence from the accused himself. Id. at 302-03. See notes 64-66 and 
accompanying text supra. Explaining that "[g]iving the blood was very close to making an admission," R. 
v. Trump, 70 Crim. App. at 305, the Court ruled that it could, but need not, exclude the blood sample. 
Id. at 303, 305. Thus, at least in cases where police obtain evidence through an improper search of the 
defendant's body, Sang appears to allow the exclusion of such evidence. 
116. For a definition of the reliability principle, see note 30 supra. 
117. See notes 30 & 54 and accompanying text supra. 
118. The decision in Sang did not clarify what evidence the House of Lords considered to be taken 
"from the accused" and left considerable confusion especially with regard to search and seizure cases. 
See note 115 supra. Commentators do seem to agree that Diplock generally intended that trial courts 
define evidence "from the accused" as that evidence which the police have induced the defendant to 
produce himself. Comment, Death of a Discretion, 4 OTAGO L. REv. 503, 507 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 
Death of a Discretion]; Pattenden, supra note 12, at 675-76. See also R. v. Trump, 70 Crim. App. at 305 
(1979). 
119. See text accompanying note 33 supra. 
120. The court did not discuss the reliability of the results in the Payne decision [1963]1 W.L.R. 637. 
121. R. v. Sang, 1980 A.C. at 435-36. 
122. Death of a Discretwn, supra note 118, at 507. Although the author does recognize that Lord 
Diplock relied heavily on the right to silence in formulating the discretion to exclude evidence eluci-
dated in Sang, id. at 506-07, the author, nevertheless, states that "Lord Diplock's views were evidently 
premised on the traditional 'reliability' view .... " Id. at 507. This view of the Sang decision leads the 
author directly into the apparent inconsistency between an adherence to the reliability principle and the 
failure of that principle to explain the Barker and Payne decisions, and results in the author concluding 
that Lord Diplock's approach contains "little logic" and produces "strangely contradictory results." Id. 
Pattenden also struggled with the reliability issue, although she did appreciate that reliability was not the 
key principle in Diplock's approach to the exclusion of evidence. Pattenden. supra note 12, at 676. 
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misplaced because Lord Diplock did not base his analogy on the reliability 
principle but on what he considered to be a more fundamental principle, the 
right to silence,12:l Lord Diplock recognized that the reliability principle did once 
underlie the discretion to exclude confessions '24 but noted that increased efforts 
to safeguard the accused's right to silence moved the courts to extend that 
discretion to other types of evidence, 123 Therefore, to Diplock, protection of the 
accused's right to silence is the basis for the discretion to exclude evidence,'26 
Furthermore, Lord Diplock used the term "the right to silence" to refer to the 
broader concept embodied in the maxim "nemo debet prodere se ipsum," which he 
translated as "no one can be required to be his own betrayer."'27 This broad use 
of the term "right to silence" enabled Lord Diplock to use the similarly broad 
phrase "from the accused" when referring to the type of evidence, whether in 
physical or oral form, which trial courts may properly exclude. '2H For example, 
according to Lord Diplock, the Barker and Payne cases involved evidence ob-
tained "from the accused," although technically neither case involved "si-
lence."'29 Thus, because of the breadth of the "from the accused" discretion, 
Lord Diplock could consistently derive an analogy between confessions and the 
Barker and Payne type of evidence. Diplock achieved this consistency by finding 
the right to silence to justify the exclusion of both types of evidence. 
Lord Diplock failed to cite any authority for this interpretation of the discre-
tion 130 and did not further elaborate, on a practical level, which types of cases 
would involve violations of the right to silence. '3' Nevertheless, the Sang opinion 
represented a clear shift from an exclusionary discretion based on reliability to a 
discretion based on the protection of a right. '32 One commentator characterized 
this shift as indicating an increased judicial respect for the protection of rights: 
"[T]heir Lordships seem to be rejecting both the reliability principle and the 
disciplinary principle in favor of the protective principle .... [This rejection] is 
im portant for the attitude to the role of the trial judge in the prosecution process 
123. R. v. Sang, 1980 A.C. at 436. 
124/d. 
125. /d. 
126. Id. 
127. /d. This Comment, therefore, also uses this term to refer to the broader concept embodied in 
that maxim. For a discussion of the history and scope of the English privilege against self-incrimination, 
see CROSS, supra note 26, at 227-33. 
128. R. v. Sang, 1980 A.C. at 437. 
129. /d. at 435. 
130. Id. at 436. In fact, Diplock limited his discussion of the right to silence, as opposed to his 
discussion of the Barker and Payne cases, to the translation noted in the text accompanying note 128 
supra. 
131. See note 115 supra. 
132. Pattenden, supra note 12, at 676, stated that "[clases such as Payne and]effrey v. Black [discussed 
notes 67-74 and accompanying text supral are difficult to reconcile unless the courts are understood to 
be primarily concerned with unfair self-incrimination and not with the means the police use to get 
evidence." For further development of this point, see §§ IV and V infra. 
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which [it] reveal[s)."133 Thus, despite failing to detail the practical application of 
the discretion to exclude evidence, the House of Lords in Sang perhaps more 
importantly established a foundation for the discretion's future application by 
determining the right to silence to be the basic right which the discretion should 
protect. 
IV. THE PROPOSALS OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
A. The Aim of the Royal Commission 
On June 23, 1977, Prime Minister James Callaghan announced the appoint-
ment of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure. 134 The Prime Minister 
directed the Commission to conduct an extensive review of the entire English 
criminal justice systeml35 and to recommend reforms in any or all aspects of the 
criminal process. 136 The Royal Commission later noted that two considerations 
had prompted the English government to attempt such a 'comprehensive re-
form.137 First, English authorities had not undertaken a similar effort in over 
seventy years and had therefore subjected the criminal justice system to only 
piecemeal reform. 13B Second, the increasing rate of crime in England and Wales 
had caused a growing public debate concerning the effectiveness of existing 
methods of crime investigation and controJ.139 By January, 1981, the Commis-
133. Mirfield, Confessions - the "Person in Authority" Requirement, 1981 CRIM. L. REv. 92, 102. Al-
though Mirfield failed to adequately define the term "protective principle," perhaps one may best 
understand that term by referring to the theory that the government has a duty to protect constitutional 
rights, or, in England's case, common law and traditional rights. Sunderland, supra note 10, at 368-71. 
Professor Sunderland aptly illustrated the American view of the protective principle with a passage 
taken from Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914): 
[T]he duty of giving to [the founh amendment] force and effect is obligatory upon all 
entrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws. The tendency of those 
who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain convictions by means of unlawful 
seizures and enforced confessions ... finds no sanction in the judgments of the courts .... 
Sunderland, supra note 10, at 371. However, the protective principle as the Supreme Court announced 
in Weeks does not represent the current justification for the exclusionary rule in the United States. See 
note 256 and accompanying text infra. 
134. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 19, § 1.1. 
135. ld. 
136. /d. at iv. Specifically, the Prime Minister instructed the Commission to examine "the powers and 
duties of the police in the investigation of offences," "the rights and duties" of suspected criminals, the 
prosecutorial process, and any other feature of the criminal process it determined to be in need of 
review.ld. 
137. /d. § 1.1. The Commission also compiled a detailed review of the current state of the law in 
England. This review encompassed hoth the common law and statutory reforms in the law relating to 
the criminal process. THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, THE INVESTIGATION AND 
PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENCES IN ENGLAND AND WALES: THE LAw AND PROCEDURE, CMD. No. 
8092-1 (1981) [hereinafter cited as ROYAL COMMISSION: THE LAW AND PROCEDURE]. 
138. ROYAL COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 19, § 1.1. 
139. ld. §§ 1.2-1.5. The Commission further noted that the public debate had focused in particular 
on two controversies. In its ELEVENTH REPORT (EVIDENCE) of 1972, the Criminal Law Revision Commit-
tee recommended the official abandonment of some procedural safeguards relating to the accused's 
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sion had completed its task and released an extensive Report l40 which recom-
mended extensive reform both in the manner in which police conduct searches 
and seizuresl4 ! and questioning,142 and in the prosecutorial system. 143 The 
Commission included in its Report proposals to substantially modify the exercise 
and scope of the exclusionary rule as applied by English trial courts. 144 
In its examination of the exclusionary rule, the Royal Commission perceived 
its purpose as twofold. First, the Commission sought to provide police with the 
certainty that courts would admit evidence which police had secured in properly 
conducted investigations. I '" Second, the Commission attempted to strike a bal-
ance between the interests of the community and the rights of an individual 
accused of a crime. 146 The Commission was well aware of the difficulty of 
achieving such a balance. 147 Five years prior to the appointment of the Royal 
Commission, the Criminal Law Revision Committee l4H had issued recommenda-
tions for changes in the law of evidence in criminal trials. These recommenda-
tions included a weakening of the procedural safeguards which enforced the 
accused's right to silence. 149 The Committee's Report generated a tremendous 
public debate over the proper aim of a criminal trial, i.e., whether to "get results" 
right to silence during police interrogation. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT,supra note 19, §§ 1.24-1.31. See 
CRIMINAL LAw REVISION COMMITTEE, ELEVENTH REpORT (EVIDENCE), CMD. No. 4991 §§ 24-27 (1972) 
[hereinafter cited as ELEVENTH REPORT]; notes 148-51 and accompanying text infra. The Maxwell 
Confait murder case also stirred considerable public reaction. In that case, the police were accused of 
violating the rights of juvenile defendants during interrogation. This case is discussed in ROYAL 
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 19, § 1.5. See also THE CONFAIT CASE. REpORT BY THE HON. SIR 
HENRY FISHER (1977), London HMSO HC 90, as cited in Note, The Fisher Report, 1978 CRIM. L. REv. 
117. 
140. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 19. 
141. See generally id. at ch. 3. 
142. See generally id. at ch. 4. 
143. See generally id. at chs. 6-8. 
144. See id. §§ 3.47-3.51, 3.119-3.123,4.115-4.135. 
145. [d. § 4.131. 
146. !d. § 1.11. 
147. See generally id. §§ 1.24-1.35. 
148. The Criminal Law Revision Committee is a committee of Parliament which in 1959 the Crown 
directed "to examine such aspects of the criminal law of England and Wales as the Home Secretary may 
from time to time refer to the committee, to consider whether the law requires revision and to make 
recommendations." ELEVENTH REPORT, supra note 139, at p. 3. 
149. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 19, §§ 1.25-1.26. The Criminal Law Revision Committee 
proposed to allow the jury to consider the accused's claim of the right to silence at trial: 
We propose to restrict greatly the so-called "right of silence" enjoyed by suspects when 
interrogated by the police or by anyone charged with the duty of investigating offences or 
charging offenders. By the right of silence in this connection we mean the rule that, if the 
suspect, when being interrogated, omits to mention some fact which would exculpate him, but 
keeps this back till the trial, the court or jury may not infer that his evidence on this issue at the 
trial is untrue. Under our proposal it will be permissible to draw this inference if the circum-
stancesjustify it. The suspect will still have the "right of silence" in the sense that it is no offence 
to refuse to answer questions or tell his story when interrogated; but if he chooses to exercise 
his right, he will risk having an adverse inference drawn against him at his trial. 
ELEVENTH REPORT, supra note 139, § 28. 
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or to protect rights. 130 In fact, the debate became so heated that Parliament 
never acted on the Committee's proposals.1 51 
The Royal Commission attempted to avoid a similar controversy by construct-
ing an empirical basis on which to rest its recommendations.152 Because it 
conducted extensive factual research, the Commission presented to Parliament 
not the product of an insulated body of academics but a response to the public 
debate over the criminal justice system and its procedural safeguards which has 
continued during the past decade in England.153 The Royal Commission relied 
upon twelve research projects undertaken at its request,154 received over 400 
written submissions from interested parties/ 55 visited law enforcement offices 
throughout the British Commonwealth and the United States156 and heard 
testimony from over twenty invited witnesses.157 Therefore, the Commission's 
Report not only contains a set of formal proposals for application of the 
exclusionary rule but also incorporates the views of the English people concern-
ing the proper scope of their nation's exclusionary remedy. 
B. The Balance Between Individual Rights and Community Interests 
The Royal Commission prefaced its recommendations with a discussion of 
those factors which affect the balance between individual and community inter-
ests. First, the Commission acknowledged that much of the public held the 
"results-oriented" view that all evidence which would aid in the conviction of a 
guilty defendant should be admissible. 15B However, the Commission also recog-
nized that, in opposition to the "results-oriented" view, three principles dictate 
the exclusion of certain evidence. The first of these principles, the "protective 
principle,"159 provides that courts should exclude evidence that police have 
obtained in violation of an accused's rights. 160 According to this principle, courts 
150. RoYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 19, §§ 1.24, 1.27-1.31. 
151. [d. § 1.31. 
152. /d. §§ 1.34-1.35. 
153. /d. 
154. Comment, Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, 1981 CRIM. L. REv. 437. The Criminal Law 
Review outlined these research projects. Comment, TIu! Year of tlu! Royal Commission, 1981 CRIM. L. REv. 
1; Comment, Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, 1981 CRIM. L. REv. 125. 
155. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 19, at pp. 198-99. The Appendix contains a list of 
contributors. [d. at pp. 206-20. 
156. [d. at pp. 199-201. Members of the Commission visited every police force in England and Wales, 
as well as law enforcement agencies in the countries of Northern Ireland, Scotland, The Republic of 
Ireland, The Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Canada and Australia and the cities of St. Louis, 
Columbus, Cincinnati and San Diego in the United States. [d. at p. 200. 
157. /d. at p. 201. The Appendix contains the list of witnesses. [d. at pp. 206-20. 
158. /d. § 1.32. See also the discussion of the "crime control model," which is analogous to this 
"results-oriented" view, in Sunderland, supra note 10, at 353-65. 
159. The House of Lords gave great weight to the protective principle in the Sang decision. See 133 
and accompanying text supra. 
160. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 19, § 4.130. For a full discussion of the protective 
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have a duty to exclude illegally obtained evidence because the government 
should not gain an advantage over the accused through its own wrongdoing and 
disregard for individual rights. 161 Second, the "reliability principle"162 directs 
trial courts to exclude evidence which police have improperly obtained because 
that evidence may be of questionable reliability.163 According to that principle, 
introduction of that evidence would deny the accused a fair trial. 164 Finally, the 
"disciplinary principle"165 provides that courts should exclude illegally obtained 
evidence, regardless of its reliability, in order to deter police from violating the 
rights of individ ual citizens. 166 The main task the Royal Commission undertook 
was the determination of the proper weight a court was to give each of these 
three principles in the balance between individual and community interests. 167 
The Royal Commission rejected the disciplinary principle as an invalid basis 
for the exclusion of evidence. 16B Citing critics of the American exclusionary 
rule,169 the Commission stated that the use of the exclusionary power to deter 
police misconduct would create unacceptable delays in the administration of 
justice. 17o Instead, the Commission concluded that the government could more 
effectively deter illegal police practices through a system of disciplinary review 
and the allowance of a civil action in tort against state agents who violated the 
rights of citizens. 1 71 
On the other hand, the Royal Commission accepted the reliability and protec-
tive principles as valid considerations in the formulatin of rules governing the 
exclusion of evidence. 172 Recognizing the tension between the "results-oriented" 
principle, see Ashworth, Excluding Evitknce as Protecting Rights, 1977 CRIM. L. REv. 723, 725-26, 732-35 
(1977) [hereinafiter cited as Ashworth]; note 133 supra. 
161. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 19, § 4.130. 
162. The reliability principle has been the traditional basis for the exclusion of illegally obtained 
confessions. See note 30 and accompanying text supra. However, in Sang, Lord Diplock apparently 
rejected the reliability principle in favor of the protective principle as the proper basis for the exclusion 
of evidence. See notes 122-25, 133 and accompanying text supra. 
163. ROYAL COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 19, §4.123. See also Ashworth, supra note 160, at 723-25. 
164. Ashworth, supra note 160, at 723-25. 
165. The House of Lords rejected the disciplinary principle as the basis for the exclusion of evidence 
in Sang. See note 100 and accompanying text supra. 
166. ROYAL COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 19, §§ 4.125-4.128. See also Ashworth, supra note 160, at 
723-25. 
167. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 19, § 1.11. 
168. /d. § 4.128. 
169. /d. For a discussion of the exclusionary rule in the United States and its criticisms, see § V infra. 
1'0. ROYAL COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 19, § 4.128. 
171. /d. §§ 3.123, 4.117-4.119. The Commission did not discuss in any detail the specific measures 
that citizens could take against police officers or the nature of the civil remedy. /d. However, the 
Commission did present a statistical summary of the complaints lodged against the police by the public 
and the disciplinary and criminal proceedings which followed such complaints in 1978 and 1979. ROYAL 
COMMISSION: THE LAW AND PROCEDURE, supra note 137, at 179-82. For criticisms of the effectiveness of 
such alternative remedies in the United States, see authorities cited at note 274 infra. 
172. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 19, § 4.131. These principles were central to the 
Commission's work. For example, the Commission introduced its chapter on police questioning by 
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view and these two principles, the Commission recommended that Parliament 
enact a system of rules which would effectuate a balance among these consid-
erations.173 The Commission intended that these rules eliminate the role of 
judicial discretion in the application of the exclusionary rule. l74 The Commis-
sion's particular proposals in the areas of searches and seizures, confessions and 
evidence obtained "from the accused" illustrate the nature of the Commission's 
balancing process and the relative weight that the Commission gave to the 
"results-oriented" view and the reliability and protective principles. 
1. Search and Seizure 
In its Report, the Royal Commission made detailed proposals regarding the 
proper procedures by which police should conduct searches and seizures. I 75 The 
Report contained recommendations that warrants should specify the premises to 
be searched and the objects of the search, that courts should place time lim-
itations on the execution of warrants, that the execution of the warrant should 
not extend beyond the objects of the search, that police should acknowledge the 
receipt of all seized articles and that police should return the endorsed warrant 
to the issuing court. l76 In addition to outlining these technical procedures, the 
Commission noted that police, acting under the authority of a valid warrant, 
should seize only items specified in the warrant or other evidence relating to the 
commission of a "grave" crime. 177 After detailing these recommendations, the 
Commission proposed that "[i]tems seized otherwise than in this way may not be 
used in evidence."178 
The Commission's proposal, however, did not formulate a broad exclusionary 
rule which would exclude a full range of evidence on the basis of technical 
procedural violations. In a subsequent section, the Royal Commission stated that 
noting that two "critical and related questions" which arose during their discussions were "[h]ow best to 
safeguard [the right of silence] and other rights of a suspect who is being questioned ... [a]nd how most 
effectively to secure that statements made to the police are reliable and accurately recorded?" [d. § 4.1. 
173. [d. §§ 1.32,4.131. 
174. /d. § 4.131. The Royal Commission explained the necessity of eliminating discretion in the 
administration of the rule as follows: 
/d. 
[T]he Commission considers that it is not satisfactory to leave the content and enforcement of 
these rules to the courts .... Parliament should take the responsibility for deciding what the 
rules should be .... The police need a greater measure of certainty than the existing rules and 
the manner used to enforce them provide. 
175. See text accompanying notes 176-77 mfra for a discussion of some of these procedural recom-
mendations. The Royal Commission summarized the procedural framework for the proper execution 
of searches and seizures at §§ 3.45-3.49 of the ROYAL COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 19. 
176. /d. § 3.47. 
177. /d. § 3.49. The Commission defined "grave" offenses as a wide range of crimes including serious 
offences against the person, sexual offenses, serious offences against property, serious "dishonesty 
offences" (such as counterfeiting, corruption or fraud), burglary, drug offences and blackmail. [d. § 3.7. 
178. /d. § 3.49. 
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a trial court could exclude only evidence of a non-grave offense which police 
discovered incidentally to an otherwise valid search.179 In an effort to further 
clarify its recommendation, the Commission stressed that mere technical viola-
tions of the recommended procedural rules should not lead to the exclusion of 
evidence. 18o The Commission proposed instead that remedies for technical viola-
tions include only internal disciplinary measures and a civil cause of action in 
tort.181 
This distinction between the remedies recommended by the Royal Commis-
sion for procedural violations and for the incidental seizure of evidence of a 
non-grave crime rests on the nature of the right protected by each proposed 
rule. The Commission designed the procedural rules to achieve "greater open-
ness," "accountability"182 and conduct consistent with "good police practice."183 
In contrast, English courts have traditionally excluded incidentally-seized evi-
dence of a non-grave offense in order to protect the important property-based 
right of persons to be free from general searches. 184 The Royal Commission 
recommended that courts continue this traditional practice because of the im-
portance of property rights in English common law.18s Apparently, the Royal 
Commission considered it necessary to recommend the exclusion of evidence 
only when the state violated not only a rule of procedural preference but also 
violated a right traditionally and emphatically protected by English law. Thus, 
noted the Commission, "[w]e appreciate that the obligatory exclusion of evi-
dence at trial may appear an inflexible restriction, but the right of members of 
the public to be free from general searches must be respected."186 
179. Id. § 3.122. 
180. Id. §§ 3.51, 3.122-123. 
181. Id. § 3.51. For the Commission's treatment of these remedies, see note 171 supra. 
182. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 19, § 3.46. 
183. Id. § 3.47. 
184. Id. § 3.49. 
185. lidstone, (3) Investigative Powers and the Rights of the Citizen, 1981 CRIM. L. REv. 454, 460-61. 
Lidstone criticizes the distinction drawn by the Royal Commission as largely artificial: "There is no 
obligatory exclusion of evidence following an unlawful stop and search of persons, one therefore 
assumes that the right of privacy is more fundamental when surrounded by bricks and mortar." Id. at 
461. 
An early American decision, Boyd v. United SfJJtes, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), illustrates the fundamental 
role of the English respect for property rights in fashioning remedies for illegal searches and seizures. 
In that case, the Supreme Court described the prominent role that the colonial rejection of the King's 
power to conduct general searches played in the formation of the American nation. Id. at 622-26. The 
Court also quoted at length from Lord Camden's statement that the right to be free from unlawful 
searches is based on property rights. Id. at 627-29, quoting from Lord Camden's opinion in Entick v. 
CaTTington and Three Other King's Messengers, 19 Howell's St. Trials 1029 (1765). Camden's opinion 
included this declaration: "The great end for which men entered into society was to secure their 
property. That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable in all instances where it has not been 
taken away or abridged by some public law for the good of the whole." Id. at 627. 
186. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 19, § 3.49. 
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With regard to the balancing of interests, then, the Commission placed great 
weight on the protective principle's exclusion of evidence when an important 
individual right was threatened but gave that principle less weight when the 
Commission viewed the threatened rights as less important and based only on 
considerations of recommended procedure. In the latter instances, the recog-
nized public desire to "get results" appeared to outweigh the protective principle 
and led the Royal Commission to propose that such evidence be ruled admissi-
ble.187 
2. Confessions 
The Royal Commission proposed sweeping changes in the methods police use 
to obtain incriminating statements from the accused.188 The purpose of these 
proposed changes was to im prove police accuracy in the recording of statements 
made by the accused and to ensure the reliability of voluntary statements when 
the prosecution later offered them against the accused at triaJ.189 However, the 
Commission did not recommend that courts exclude evidence that the state had 
obtained in violation of the proposed rules despite the fact that police had 
procured the evidence improperly.19o Instead, the court should admit an ille-
gally obtained statement and the judge should indicate to the jury that the 
statement's reliability is questionable and, thus, of reduced probative value.191 
The Royal Commission did propose one significant exception to this stated rule, 
however. The Commission recommended that courts automatically exclude evi-
dence obtained by means of "violence, threats of violence, torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment."192 
The Royal Commission used its balancing of the "results-oriented" view and 
the reliability and protective principles to distinguish those violations which 
would demand the exclusion of evidence from those which would not demand 
exclusion. In the Report's chapter on questioning, the Commission repeatedly 
187. The Royal Commission also favored a limited exclusionary rule for reasons other than the 
"results-oriented" public pressure. These reasons included the reported failure of the American 
exclusionary rule to deter police misconduct (ROYAL CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 19, § 4.125; see 
generally § I supra), the potential for trial delays accompanying the adoption of a broad exclusionary rule 
(ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 19, § 4.128) and the risk of lessened public respect for a 
criminal system which allows police misconduct to result in the "patently guilty going free." /d. 
188. /d. §§ 4.1-4.114. The changes the Commission discussed include improved police note-taking, 
Uf. §§ 4.9-4.15; tape recording of statements made by the accused, Uf. §§ 4.16-4.30; video recording of 
some questioning sessions, Uf. § 4.131; increased respect for a suspect's refusal to answer questions 
before an arrest is made, Uf. §§ 4.33-4.47; the cautioning of suspects as to their right to silence before 
any questioning, Uf. §§ 4.48-4.62; the use of polygraph tests to insure reliability in some instances, Uf. § 
4.76 and allowing increased availability of counsel to the accused, Uf. §§ 4.81-4.100. 
189. [d. §§ 4.1, 4.2. 
190. [d. § 4.133. 
191. /d. 
192. [d. § 4.132. 
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referred to the reliability principle as central to its deliberations. 193 In this 
regard, the Commission unequivocally asserted that "reliability is the primary 
purpose of the code of practice for interviewing suspects .... "194 In accordance 
with this view, the Commission developed the vast majority of the proposed rules 
in response to recurring problems of reliability rather than in order to protect 
individual rights.'93 The Commission also recommended that courts should not 
enforce the reliability-based rules of police practice by excluding the evidence 
that police had obtained in violation of the suggested procedure.'96 Instead, the 
Commission proposed that courts achieve enforcement of reliability-based rules 
by strengthening internal police disciplinary measures and the right of aggrieved 
parties to bring civil actions in tort.' 97 
However, the Royal Commission proposed that trial judges distinguish be-
tween enforcement of reliability-based procedures and the enforcement of the 
rule that police cannot obtain evidence by means of "violence, threats of violence, 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment."198 The Commission proposed that 
courts apply an automatic exclusionary rule to such violations "in order to mark 
the seriousness of any [such] breach ... and society's abhorence of such con-
duct .... "199 The importance of the rights violated, not the highly questionable 
nature of the evidence obtained, requires the automatic application of the exclu-
sionary rule in such cases of oppression.20o 
In the area of confessions, therefore, the Royal Commission advocated that trial 
courts should not enforce the procedural rules by excluding evidence because 
the Commission had recommended those procedural rules primarily due to 
considerations of reliability. On the other hand, courts should automatically 
exclude confessions which police had obtained by violating the right-based 
rules. 201 In terms of the balance sought by the Commission, the "results-
193. [d. §§ 4.1, 4.2, 4.117, 4.131, 4.132, 4.133. 
194. !d. § 4.133. 
195. The Commission made some proposals that did not include any significant discussion of the 
protection of rights; these proposals, therefore, seem to be a response solely to considerations of 
reliability. See, e.g., the proposals on improved note taking, Uf. §§ 4.9-4.15, and tape recording of 
interviews, id. §§ 4.16-4.30. On the other hand, the Commission did recommend the preservation of 
some procedural safeguards of the rights of a criminally accused, Uf. §§ 4.77-4.80, but generally limited 
the proposals to a "reaffirmation" of existing and established rights. !d. Finally, the Commission dealt at 
length with the right to counsel, Uf. §§ 4.81-4.100, and discussed the importance of protecting that right. 
!d. §§ 4.83, 4.86-4.91. At the end of that discussion, however, the Commission made clear that reliability 
was again a major consideration in fashioning remedies for violations of the recommended pro-
cedures. -[d. § 4.92. According to the Commission, "lack of legal advice does not of itself result in 
statements which are unreliable and should not automatically lead to their exclusion as evidence." !d. 
196. [d. § 4.133. 
197. [d. § 4.117-4.121. For the Commission's treatment of these remedies, see note 171 supra. 
198. ROYAL COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 19, § 4.132. 
199. [d. 
200. [d. 
20 I. [d. §§ 4.132-4.133. 
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oriented" view often does outweigh the reliability principle, but in cases involv-
ing basic rights it cannot outweigh the protective principle. 
3. Evidence Obtained "From the Accused" 
As this Comment previously discussed,202 in the 1979 case of R. v. Sang the 
House of Lords ruled that evidence illegally obtained "from the accused" is 
subject to a discretionary exclusion.203 In Sang, Lord Diplock rejected those 
decisions which attempted to base this discretion on the reliability principle204 
and stated that the traditional English right to silence was the proper basis of the 
discretion to exclude evidence illegally obtained "from the accused."205 
The Royal Commission also recognized the fundamental nature of the right to 
silence.206 In addition, the Commission considered in some detail the decisions in 
Kuruma and Sang and the development in those cases of the discretion to exclude 
evidence obtained "from the accused."207 Because the Royal Commission applied 
the exclusionary rule to the right-based rules it had proposed in the areas of 
search and seizure208 and confessions,209 one may reasonably assume that the 
Commission would also apply that remedy to the right-based rule that police may 
not illegally obtain evidence "from the accused." However, the Commission 
recommended no such exclusion for this type of evidence.2lo In fact, the Royal 
Commission recommended limiting the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence 
to the two types of evidence that this Comment has previously mentioned -
evidence of a non-grave offense seized by police incidentally to an otherwise 
valid search and evidence obtained by police through "violence, threats of 
violence, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment."211 
The failure of the Royal Commission to afford the "from the accused" rule 
with exclusionary protection, however, is consistent with the Commission's use of 
basic principles to determine the scope of the exclusionary rule. The Royal 
202. See § III supra. 
203. 1980 A.C. 402. 437. 
204. /d. 436. 
205. /d. For a discussion of what Lord Diplock meant by "right to silence," see notes 127-29 and 
accompanying text supra. 
206. The Commission's Report contains a detailed discussion of the right to silence. ROYAL COMMIS-
SION REpORT, supra note 19, §§ 4.33-4.67. The Report later describes the right to silence as a "fundamen-
tal civil libert[y]." Id. § 4.130. 
207. /d. § 4.123; ROYAL COMMISSION: THE LAW AND PROCEDURE, supra note 137, §§ 131-33. 
208. See notes 175-87 and accompanying text supra. 
209. See notes 188-201 and accompanying text supra. 
210. ROYAL COMMISStoN REPORT, supra note 19, §§ 4.123-4.128. 
211. The Royal Commission specifically recommended that courts apply the exclusionary rule to 
evidence ofa non-grave offense, Uf. §§ 3.49, 3.51, and to confessions which the state had obtained by 
"violence, threats of violence, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment." Id. § 4.132. However, the 
Commission did not recommend that courts apply the exclusionary rule to other forms of evidence. See, 
e.g., id. §§ 3.51, 3.122-3.123, 4.30, 4.92, 4.123-4.132. 
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Commission accurately noted that the Sang decision limited the trial judge's 
discretion to exclude non-prejudicial evidence to admissions, confessions and 
other evidence obtained "from the accused."212 However, the Commission ap-
parently misunderstood the principle behind the House of Lord's recognition of 
this discretion; it noted that "[tJhe rationale behind the present law is that 
evidence of certain kinds is or may be so unreliable as to preclude its being heard 
by the jury; this is the so-called 'reliability principle' for exclusion."213 Thus, 
despite Lord Diplock's insistence that he based his formulation of the exclusion-
ary rule on the protection of the right to silence, the Royal Commission 
interpreted Diplock's rule as reliability-based. 214 As a result, the Royal Commis-
sion did not recommend the automatic exclusion of evidence illegally obtained 
"from the accused," and even hinted that courts should abandon the discretion 
to exclude such evidence as recognized in Sang. 213 Therefore, the Royal Com-
mission failed to recommend the exclusion of evidence illegally obtained "from 
the accused" not because the Commission inconsistently applied the exclusionary 
remedy to particular right-based rules, but because the Commission mistakenly 
interpreted the "from the accused" rule as based on the reliability principle 
rather than on the protective principle. 
C. Exclusion of Evidence and the Protection of Rights 
The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure balanced the public pressure 
for "results" (i.e., the admission of all relevant evidence) against the important 
safeguards afforded by the reliability and protective principles. 216 In performing 
212. ld. § 4.123. For a discussion of the Sang decision, see § HI supra. 
213. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 19, § 4.123. 
214. ld. The Royal Commission did recognize the right to silence as fundamental. The Commission 
termed the right "not to be compelled to incriminate oneself" a fundamental liberty in its Report. ld. 
§ 4.130. However, the Commission apparently chose not to recognize the largely unsupported reasoning 
of Lord Diplock (see notes 130-31 and accompanying text supra), perhaps because of the long history of 
the reliability principle as the basis for the exclusion of confessions. See notes 30 & 54 and accompanying 
text supra. 
215. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 19, § 4.13\. Most of the Commission members con-
cluded that it was "not satisfactory to leave the content and enforcement of these rules to the courts .... " 
ld. In addition, the Commission proposed that the application of remedies for police violations be 
uniform and certain: 
[ The police I should know that if they comply with the rules their evidence will be admitted, to 
be weighed by the court for what it is worth. The exceptions written into the rules to give 
flexibility to meet the emergency situation or to deal with grave crimes are intended to provide 
more certain guidance to the police than the subsequent exercise of judicial discretion .... 
ld. See also id. § 4.118. 
One commentator has also suggested that the Royal Commission proposed to eliminate the discretion 
to exclude prejudicial evidence. Inman, Th£ Admissibility of Confesswns, 1981 CRIM. L. REv. 469, 470, 
citing ROYAL COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 19, § 4.131 (which is quoted from supra this note). 
However, the Royal Commission's failure to specifically propose the retention of that aspect of the 
judicial discretion most likely reflects the Commission's focus on police procedure. For example, the 
Commission gave only passing mention to the concept of prejudicial evidence in their review of the 
present state of the law. ROYAL COMMISSION: THE LAW AND PROCEDURE, supra note 137, §§ 131-33. 
216. See note 146 and accompanying text supra. 
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this task, the Royal Commission consistently concluded that courts should auto-
matically exclude illegally obtained evidence in order to protect important indi-
vidual rights but should never exclude evidence merely to ensure that the 
prosecution uses only evidence that is reliable. Specifically, the Commission 
recommended that courts automatically exclude evidence that police obtain in 
violation of the basic right of a person to be free from general searches and that 
evidence police obtain in violation of mere procedural rules should always be 
admissible.217 Similarly, the Commission recommended that courts automatically 
exclude confessions obtained by means of violence or torture in order to protect 
the basic right of an individual to be free from such inhuman or degrading 
treatment.218 Courts should consistently hold admissible, on the other hand, 
confessions police obtain illegally but not by means of violence, threats of vio-
lence, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment.219 Finally, since the Royal 
Commission concluded that police who illegally obtain evidence "from the ac-
cused" do not violate the accused's basic right to silence, the Commission appar-
ently did not recommend the application of the exclusionary rule to evidence 
obtained in that manner.220 
The Royal Commission's consistent application of the exclusionary rule is not 
the result of mere coincidence. Instead, that consistency is the product of the 
Commission's determination that trial courts apply the exclusionary rule only to 
violations of the most fundamental rights. In the introduction to its Report, the 
Commission posed a question that it considered "should be the concern not only 
oflawyers or police officers but of every citizen":221 "Are [the rights and liberties 
of the individual] all of equal weight; all equally and totally negotiable or are 
some natural, absolute, fundamental, above the law, part of the human being's 
birthright?"222 That the Commission felt obliged to even consider such 
"difficult" and "insoluable"223 questions indicates that the Commission was 
concerned with the relative importance of various rights. 
The nature of the protective principle which the Royal Commission adopted 
to safeguard certain rights further illustrates the Commission's recognition that 
rights are of varying importance. As this Comment has mentioned,224 the protec-
tive principle provides that courts should exclude evidence in those instances 
where the introduction of that evidence would serve to violate individual rights. 
217. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 19, § 3.51. See notes 175-87 and accompanying text 
supra. 
218. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 19, § 4.132. See notes 188-201 and accompanying text 
supra. 
219. ROYAL COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 19, §§ 4.132-4.133. 
220. ld. §§ 4.123-4.128. See also notes 202-15 and accompanying text supra. 
221. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 19, § 1.12. 
222. ld. 
223. !d. 
224. See notes 159-61 and accompanying text supra. 
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The Commission did incorporate the protective principle into its balancing 
process.225 However, in its Report, the Commission stressed that it was incor-
porating the protective principle in such a way as to effectuate a balance which 
would give great weight to the principle only when the introduction of certain 
evidence would threaten the most basic individual rights. The Commission 
stated: "[T]he protective principle can also be used in a way that distinguishes 
between rights that involve fundamental civil liberties (the right not to be sub-
jected to violence, or not to be compelled to incriminate oneself), and rights 
created in order to produce reliable evidence .... "226 Accordingly, the Commis-
sion concluded that those procedures it designed to achieve "openness," "ac-
countability" and "good police practice"227 in the areas of searches and seizures 
and confessions safeguard rights not so fundamental as to deserve the protection 
of the exclusionary rule. Rules the Commission formulated to safeguard the 
rights to be free from general searches and torture or violence are essential to 
the enforcement of these fundamental rights, however. Thus, those rules de-
serve the protection of the exclusionary rule. 
Therefore, the Royal Commission's recommendation that courts apply the 
exclusionary rule only to violations of fundamental rights was less a product of 
repeated and independent acts of balancing than a result of the Commission's 
conscious effort to ensure that trial courts protect the English people's most 
cherished rights. 
V. DETERRENCE AND THE PROTECTION OF RIGHTS 
A. The Protective Principle Underlies the Engli5h Exclusionary Rule 
The House of Lords and the Royal Commission applied the exclusionary rule 
only to those police improprieties that threaten fundamental rights of English 
citizens. For example, the House of Lords held that courts must apply the 
exclusionary rule to evidence which police obtain in violation of the broadly 
interpreted right to silence.228 The Royal Commission also found that courts 
should protect, through use of the exclusionary rule, the right of persons to be 
free from general searches, torture and violence.229 Both the House of Lords 
and the Royal Commission, therefore, reached the identical conclusion that 
certain rights are so basic as to require the stringent protection of the exclusion-
ary rule. 
However, unlike American courts, which refer to the Constitution for guid-
225. See note 172 and accompanying text supra. 
226. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 19, § 4.130. 
227. See text accompanying notes 175-78, 182-83 supra. 
228. See § III supra. 
229. See § I V supra. 
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ance in determining which rights are most basic,230 the House of Lords and the 
Royal Commission were not guided by reference to a comparable English body 
of entrenched rights. Traditional English theories do not clearly define those 
specific liberties that merit the protection of the exclusionary rule.231 Because of 
this lack of codification, the House of Lords and the Royal Commission had to 
thoroughly analyze the roots of the English exclusionary rule to determine those 
rights to be given exclusionary protection.232 Considering the depth of the 
analysis233 and the unsettled development of the exclusionary rule in En-
gland,234 the failure of the House of Lords and the Royal Commission to agree 
on specific rights to which courts should apply the exclusionary rule235 is not 
surprising. 
Yet, this inconsistency should not overshadow the one dominant theme that 
emerges from a study of the R. v. Sang decision236 and the Royal Commission's 
Report. 237 Underlying both works is the conclusion that, in adherence to the 
protective principle, courts must exclude evidence which police have obtained in 
violation ofthe most basic individual rights. 238 Therefore, despite their failure to 
230. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (fourth amendment); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 
(1964) (fifth amendment right to be free from compelled self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment right to counsel). 
231. JAMES, supra note 40, at 8. 
By Act, moreover, Parliament may make any laws it pleases however perverse or "wrong" and 
the courts are bound to apply them. The enactments of Parliament are not subject to question, 
for our constitution knows no entrenched rights similar to the fundamental liberties guaran-
teed by the Constitution of the United States and safeguarded by the Supreme Court. 
Id. at 7-8. For this reason, "the English citizen must look, for the protection of his rights, not to any 
constitutional document which guarantees them but to the general rules of law enforced at any given 
time by the courts; his rights derive from the ordinary law of the land." Id. at 140. See also a report on 
the popular demand for the establishment in England of a Bill of Rights comparable to that of the 
United States, in Wilmarth, Lawyers and the Proctice of Law in England: An American Visitor's Observatwns: 
Part III, 14 lNT'L LAW. 383 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Wilmarth]. 
232. See generally §§ HI-IV supra. 
233. Id. 
234. See generally § II supra. 
235. See text accompanying notes 228-29 supra. 
236. 1980 A.C. 402. 
237. ROYAL COMMISSION REpORT, supra note 19. 
238. Furthermore, while the House of Lords and the Royal Commission rigidly adhered to the 
protective principle, they expressed this adherence more as a basic assumption than a product of an 
elaborate argument. For example, the Royal Commission did not expand on its recommendation that 
courts exclude evidence which police have obtained in violation of the right to be free from general 
searches. The Commission simply stated that "[w]e appreciate that the obligatory exclusion of evidence 
at trial may appear an inflexible restriction, but the right of members of the public to be free from 
general searches must be respected." Id. § 3.49. The Commission attempted no further discussion on 
the point. The Royal Commission also proposed that courts exclude evidence obtained by violence or 
torture, but explained only that the purpose of the recommended exclusion was to "mark the serious-
ness of any breach" of this rule and to demonstrate "society's abhorence of such conduct." Id. § 4.132. 
Finally, in no part of his R. v. Sang opinion did Lord Diplockjustify the exclusion of evidence illegally 
obtained "from the accused" other than by merely defining such evidence as that which police had 
obtained in violation of the basic right to silence. 1980 A.C. at 436. All of these assertions contain the 
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agree on specific applications of the exclusionary rule, the House of Lords and 
the Royal Commission, more importantly, established a clear principle which is 
likely to guide the future development of the English exclusionary rule. 
B. Recent Criticisms and Reevaluation of the American Exclusionary Rule 
The Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution, for which there IS no 
English counterpart, clearly expounds the basic liberties of American citizens: 239 
[NJeither the doctrine of "fundamental law" nor the idea of popular 
sovereignty based upon "natural rights" prevailed in Britain. In-
stead, Parliament succeeded in establishing its com plete legislative 
supremacy. For example, while certain personal rights are still rec-
ognized at common law ... these rights do not restrict Parliament's 
exercise of its powers. Unlike Congress, which cannot abrogate the 
personal liberties recognized by the American Constitution, Parlia-
ment can pass statutes which deprive a subject of his common-law 
rights. 240 
Yet, while American courts do not encounter the same definitional difficulties as 
do the English courts, the exclusionary rule is also currently the subject of 
extensive criticism and reevaluation in the United States. 
The Supreme Court first applied the exclusionary rule to fruits of an illegal 
search and seizure in the 1914 case of Weeks v. United States. 241 Almost fifty years 
later, the Court extended the exclusionary remedy to state violations of the 
fourth amendment in Mapp v. Ohio. 242 Judges and legal scholars have extensively 
criticized the exclusionary rule during its long period of development and 
expansion. 243 Recently, however, members of the federal judiciary have increas-
ingly urged reconsideration of the exclusionary rule244 and the Reagan Adminis-
unstated assumption that when rights are of the utmost importance, courts must look to the protective 
principle for guidance in applying the exclusionary rule. 
239. See note 230 supra. 
240. Wilmarth, supra note 231, at 385-86. 
241. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
242. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Court had refused to make this extension in 1949. Wolf 
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25. 
243. See, e.g., Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L. REv. I (1964); Burns, Mapp v. Ohw: 
An All-American Mistake, 19 DEPAUL L. REv. 80 (1969); Oaks, Studying the Excluswnary Rule in Search and 
Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Oaks). See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 672 
(Harlan, j., dissenting). 
244. Chief Justice Burger harshly criticized the exclusionary rule as early as 1971, in Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388,411 (1971) (dissenting). In 1976, he called for a strict limit on 
use of the exclusionary rule in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496-506 (1976) (concurring). Justice 
PowelIjoined Justice Burger in advocating a reevaluation of the rule in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 
606-16 (1975) (concurring), as did Justice Rehnquist in California v. Minjares, 443 U.S. 916, 916-28 
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tration has intensified efforts to narrow its SCOpe.245 
President Reagan has stated that his administration will support statutory 
reforms of the exclusionary rule246 to correct what he considers the present 
imbalance between the rights of the accused and the rights of the crime victim.247 
The President has also approved the proposal of the Attorney General's Task 
Force on Violent Crime to significantly narrow the scope of the judicial power to 
exclude evidence.248 A Justice Department official has indicated in his testimony 
before the Senate Criminal Law subcommittee that the Administration may 
support the total elimination of the exclusionary rule.249 
The Supreme Court has also evidenced a willingness to restrict the application 
of the exclusionary rule. The Court has been extremely willing to find excep-
tions to the exclusionary rule250 and has refused to extend its protection to 
(1979) (dissenting from denial of stay). Justices Blackmun and White have also expressed disfavor with 
the exclusionary rule; Justice White in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 536 (dissenting), and Justice 
Blackman in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 510 (1971). 
245. See ATTORNEY'S GENERAL TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, Final Report (released August 17, 
1981) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE]. 
246. Address by President Reagan to the International Association of Chiefs of Police, in New 
Orleans (Sept. 28, 1981) (reported in N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1981, at AI, col. 6) [hereinafter cited as 
Address]. 
247. [d. at A18, col. 2. Perhaps the most familiar expression of this imbalance is Justice (then Judge) 
Cardozo's statement that the exclusionary rule is flawed because "[t]he criminal is to go free because the 
constable has blundered." People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13,21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926). 
248. Address, supra note 246. For the specific nature of the Task Force's recommendation, see notes 
260-63 and accompanying text infra. 
249. N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1981, at A14, col. 5. 
250. There are three traditional exceptions to the exclusionary rule. The Court developed the first 
exception, known as the independent source rule, in a 1920 decision, Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. 
Unired Stares, 251 U.S. 385. This exception allows the prosecution to introduce the fruits of an illegal 
search if the prosecution is able to produce evidence of guilt by an independent source of informa-
tion. The Burger Court first applied the independent source rule to in-court identifications in United 
Stares v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980). See Gardner, Consent as a Bar to Fourth Amendment Scope -A Critique 
of a Common Theory, 71 J. CRIM. LAw & CRIMIN. 443 (1980). The Burger Court has also recently 
expanded the second traditional exception to the exclusionary rule, the attenuation doctrine. Justice 
Frankfurter first formalized the attenuation doctrine in Nardone v. Unired StaUis, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). 
The exception holds that a weakened causal connection between the illegal act and the use of the 
illegally obtained evidence as proof at trial may dissipate the illegal taint of that evidence. The Court 
broadened the scope of the attenuation doctrine in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) (state-
ments following illegal restraint admissible where detention was not coercive). See Brown v. Illinois, 422 
U.S. 590 (1975); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Note, Rawlings v. Kentucky: More on 
Unpoisoningthe Fruit or Shall WeJust Plant Another Tree?, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 257 (1981). The third 
traditional exception to the exclusionary rule is the inevitable discovery doctrine. This exception allows 
admission of illegally obtained evidence if the prosecution can show that the police would have 
discovered the evidence through other, legitimate, means. Although the Supreme Court has never 
formally recognized the inevitable discovery exception, that exception has received increased judicial 
approval. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (confession); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 
268, 276-78 (1978) (degree of witness' cooperation should be considered in determining likelihood of 
inevitable contact with police). See also 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 612, 617 (1978). 
The Court has also recognized new exceptions to the exclusionary rule. In United Stares v. Ceccolini, the 
Court held that live witness testimony could effectively dissipate the taint of illegally seized evidence. 
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 276-78. Although this development is a product of the attenua-
tion doctrine, one commentator has suggested that the Ceccolini decision may be best treated as 
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proceedings other than criminal trials. 251 In addition, five Supreme Court Jus-
tices have criticized some aspects of the rule and favor further restriction of its 
application.232 The Court will continue to have the opportunity to review the 
proper scope of the exclusionary rule.253 Because of the Court's increased 
narrowing of the exclusionary rule and the Attorney General's Task Force's 
instruction to United States Attorneys and the Solicitor General to argue for a 
good faith exception to the rule,254 further erosion of fourth amendment protec-
tion appears imminent. 
formulating a unique exception. Note, The Evisceration of the Exclusionary Ruu: the Supreme Court Invents 
the Oral Evidence Exception. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978), 15 LAND & WATER L. REv. 323 
(1980). The Burger Court has also derived an impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule, holding 
in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971) and United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) that 
the prosecution may use illegally obtained evidence to impeach the accused's false trial testimony. This 
exception has generated considerable comment. See Spector & Foster, supra note 10; Note, Ilugally 
Seized Evidence may be Used to Impeach a Defendant on Cross-examination if the Prosecutor's Questions Would 
Have Been Suggested by the Defendant's Direct Testimony. - United States v. Havens, (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1980), 30 
DRAKE L.REV. 192 (1980-1981). See also discussion of the good faith exception, notes 260-67 and 
accompanying text supra. 
251. See, e.g., the Court's refusal to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings, United 
States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974), or to civil proceedings in which a party has introd uced evidence 
illegally obtained by state agents, United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976). Furthermore, a petitioner 
may not obtain relief in a habeas corpus proceeding by reference to the exclusionary rule. Stone v. 
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
The Burger Court has used the requirement of standing to limit the application of the exclusionary 
rule. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 229 (1973) (defendants do not have standing to raise 
issue of fourth amendment protection when not on premises at time of search and alleged no property 
interest in premises); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133, 137-38 (1978) (legitimate presence on 
premises does not automatically convey standing); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in papers seized from a third party); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 
83 (1980) (prosecution may consistently maintain that a defendant possessed seized goods and that the 
defendant had no standing to invoke fourth amendment protection); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 
(1980) (defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy relating to drugs in possession). See Note, 
Fourth Amendment - The Court Further Limits Standing, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMIN. 567 (1980); Note, 
Constitutional Criminal Law -Motion to Suppress -A Question of Standing, 54 TULANE L. REv. 765 (1980). 
Whether a trial court can exclude evidence under its supervisory power is questionable in light of the 
Court's decision in United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727. In that case, the Court ruled that the federal 
courts' supervisory power did not enable the trial court to suppress evidence illegally seized from a third 
party.Id. at 735. See Note, Exclusion of Evidence Under the Supervisory Power: United States v. Payner, 66 
CORNELL L. REv. 382 (1981). 
252. See note 244 supra. 
253. Some cases now before the Court are Toubos v. California Superivr Court, Marin County (Cal. 
Ct. App., 1st Dist., 1981), appeal docketed No. 80-1912 (May 11, 1981) (application of the exclusionary 
rule to a consensual search), and Queen v. Arkansas, 271 Ark. 929 (Ark. Sup. Ct. 1981), appeal docketed 
No. 80-1961 (May 22, 1981) (application of exclusionary rule in probation revocation proceedings). 
254. TASK FORCE, supra note 245. Recommendation 40 states in part: 
We recommend that the Attorney General instruct United States Attorneys and the Solicitor 
General to urge this [good faith] rule in appropriate court proceedings, or support federal 
legislation establishing this rule, or both. If this rule can be established, it will restore the 
confidence of the public and of law enforcement officers in the integrity of criminal proceed-
ings and the value of constitutional guarantees. 
!d. at 55. 
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C. The Deterrence of Police Misconduct Underlies the American Exclusionary Rule 
In light of this criticism and promise for reform of the exclusionary rule, 
American legal theorists appear to be in need of a sound theoretical basis by 
which they can evaluate proposed changes in the rule's application. Scholars can 
best analyze proposed changes to the rule by reference to the purpose and origin 
of the exclusionary rule. This Comment has suggested that the House of Lords 
and the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure adhered to the protective 
principle's demand that courts apply the exclusionary rule to violations of fun-
damental rights in fashioning their guidelines for the proper exercise of the 
English exclusionary rule.255 The Burger Court, on the other hand, has stressed 
that the only valid justification for the application of the American exclusionary 
rule is deterrence of police misconduct.256 Whereas the Supreme Court once 
found the exclusionary rule to be "clear, specific, and constitutionally re-
quired,"257 the Court now holds the rule to be only "ajudicially created rememdy 
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deter-
rent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right ofthe party aggrieved."258 
Commentators have noted that the Court has recently defined the scope of the 
rule exclusively in reference to the deterrence principle.259 
The Reagan Administration actively supports the Supreme Court's recogni-
tion that the primary goal of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct. 
The Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime concluded that "[t]he 
purpose of the exclusionary rule, as applied to search and seizure issues, 'is to 
deter.' "260 Upon endorsing the Task Force's proposals, the President specifically 
supported the Task Force's recommendation that Congress enact legislation 
establishing a "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule.261 This good faith 
255. See generally §§ III-IV supra. 
256. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 611 (1975) 
(Powell, J., concurring in pan). A majority of the Court adopted this position in United States v. janis, 
428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) and Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484 (1976). The Coun recently gave great 
weight to the deterrence principle in Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981). 
257. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961). 
258. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348. 
259. Sunderland, supra note 10, at 353-54; Bernardi, supra note 4, at 52-53. 
260. TASK FORCE, supra note 245, at 55, quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 656. 
261. Address, supra note 246. See also N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1981, at A 14, col. 5; TASK FORCE, supra 
note 245, at 55. The recommendation of the Task Force's Final Report which the President referred to 
states in part that: 
The fundamental and legitimate purpose of the exclusionary rule - to deter illegal police 
conduct and promote respect for the rule of law by preventing illegally obtained evidence from 
being used in a criminal trial- has been eroded by the action of the courts barring evidence of 
the truth, however important, if there is any investigative error, however unintended or trivial. 
We believe that any remedy for the violation of a constitutional right should be proportional to 
the magnitude of the violation. In general, evidence should not be excluded from a' criminal 
proceeding if it has been obtained by an officer acting in the reasonable, good faith belief that it 
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exception would prohibit judges from excluding evidence which police obtain in 
the reasonable, good faith belief that their search and seizure was constitution-
ally permitted.262 Under the deterrence principle, such good faith conduct 
should not be subject to the exclusionary rule because the exclusion of evidence 
could not deter similar police actions. 263 
The Supreme Court has not formally recognized the good faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule. However, in the recent case of Michigan v. DeFillippo, 264 
the Court approached this position, holding that a trial court must admit evi-
dence that police have obtained in good faith reliance on a statute later ruled 
unconstitutional. 265 This decision is consistent with other Supreme Court deci-
sions which indicate a growing appreciation of the need for some type of good 
faith exception.266 The Fifth Circuit's recent adoption of this exception may have 
some impact on the Court.267 
It is likely, therefore, that the legislative and judicial efforts to formulate a 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule will suceed.268 The adoption of this 
exception would more firmly establish the deterrence principle as the theoretical 
basis for future application of the American exclusionary rule to violations of 
fundamental rights. 
D. Deterrence and the Protection of Fundamental Rights 
The current debate over the proper role of the exclusionary rule in a demo-
cratic society has generated much written commentary.269 This Comment sug-
gests that, although the executive, legislative and judicial branches have tended 
to favor the deterrence rationale as the basis of the rule, the protective principle 
remains a viable guide by which courts and legislatures should fashion the 
American exclusionary rule. 
was in conformity to the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. A showing that evidence was 
obtained pursuant to and within the scope of a warrant constitutes prima facie evidence of such 
a good faith belief. ... 
[d. See also note 254 supra. 
262. [d. 
263. /d. 
264. 443 U.S. 31 (1979). 
265. [d. 
266. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975); United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979); 
California v. Minjares, 443 U.S. 916 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of stay). See also Note, 
The Role of Police Officer Good Faith in Substantive Fourth Amendment Doctrine - Michigan v. De Fillippo, 443 
U.S. 31 (1979), 55 WASH. L. REV. 849 (1980). 
267. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (1980) (en bane). 
268. Bernardi,supra note 4, at 51. "It appears that if the rule is not shortly abandoned altogether as a 
means of enforcing the fourth amendment, it is virtually certain that the Court will adopt some species 
of a good faith - bad faith calculus to govern the rule's application." [d. 
269. See generally Sunderland, supra note 10 and authorities cited therein. 
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1. The Logical Consequence of the Deterrence Principle 
Chief Justice Burger has strongly argued that courts should apply the 
exclusionary rule only when such judicial action would deter illegal police con-
duct.270 Yet, the Chief Justice and others have also insisted that they couldjustify 
complete abandonment of the exclusionary rule because the exclusion of evi-
dence at trial does not deter illegal action.271 These arguments suggest that a 
deterrence-based exclusionary rule would have an extremely limited applica-
tion.272 
However, some of the exclusionary rule's harshest critics have conceded that 
the United States should not abandon the exclusionary rule until some feasible 
alternative is readily available.273 Despite this recognized need for an alternative, 
no one has yet suggested a viable remedy to replace the exclusionary rule. 
Authorities have generally discredited the most commonly suggested replace-
ments,274 such as the active maintenance of police disciplinary boards273 and a 
civil cause of action in tort. 276 Therefore, because a deterrence-based exclusion-
270. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting). See also § 5.C supra. 
271. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. at 411 (Burger, C.]., dissenting); see Sunderland, supra 
note 10, at 353-60. 
Chief Justice Burger and other critics of the rule have stated at least three reasons as to why the 
exclusionary rule fails to deter. First, the rule operates to punish prosecutors, not police. Sunderland, 
supra note 10, at 355; Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. at 416; Wingo, Growing 
Disillusionment with tM Exclusionary Rule, 25 Sw. L.]. 573, 576 (1971). Second, police do not always act in 
order to obtain a conviction. Sunderland, supra note 10, at 355; LaFave, Improving police Performance 
Through tM Exclusionary Rule - Part I: Current Police and Local Court Practices, 30 Mo. L. REv. 391, 447 
(1965). Third, some illegal police acts involve good faith conduct. Sunderland, supra note 10, at 355; 
Barrett, Excl1.lSWn oj Evidence Obtained by Illegal SearcMs - A Comment on People v. Cahan, 43 CALIF. L. 
REv. 565, 590 (1955). 
272. See concurrin~ opinion of Chief Justice Burger in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496 (1976). 
273. See Oaks,supra note 243, at 754-57. "Despite these weaknesses and disadvantages, the exclusion-
ary rule should not be abolished until there is something to take its place .... " Id. at 756. Chief Justice 
Burger also tempered his early calls for re-evaluation of the exclusionary rule with a recognition that a 
strengthening of alternative remedies must accompany an abandonment of the rule. Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. at 411-24 (dissenting). See also Bernardi, supra note 4, at 106-07. 
274. See generally Foote, Tort Remedies Jor Police Violations oj Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REv. 493 
(1955); Milner, Supreme Court Effectiveness and tM Police Organization, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 467 
(1971); Hudson, Police Review Boards and Police Accountability, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 515 (1971); 
Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical study oJtM Exclusionary Rule and its Alternatives, 2]. LEGAL STUD. 
243 (1973). But see California v. Minjares. 443 U.S. 916 (Rehnquist,]., dissenting from denial of stay) 
(arguing for increased reliance on § 1983 actions in order to lessen scope of the exclusionary rule). 
275. See Wilson & Alprin, Controlling Police Conduct: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 36 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 488 (1971). 
276. Section 1983 of the U.S. Code provides that persons may maintain a cause of action in federal 
court against state officials who deprived the individual of his constitutional rights: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 
State or Territory, or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of 
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 
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ary rule would have a severely limited application and no other effective 
remedy for violation of fundamental rights exists, increased reliance on the 
deterrence principle could lead to a situation in which no legal sanction effec-
tively protects the basic liberties of American citizens. 
2. The American Exclusionary Rule May Be Constitutionally Required 
The Supreme Court has increasingly turned to the deterrence principle III 
fashioning the proper scope of the American exclusionary rule. 277 However, the 
Court first justified the imposition of the exclusionary rule in both federal278 and 
state279 criminal proceedings by holding the rule to be a constitutionally man-
dated rememdy.280 Defenders of a prominent exclusionary rule have criticized 
the Court's movement towards a simple deterrence principle, noting that recent 
case law has ignored, but not refuted, strong arguments in favor of the rule's 
constitutional basis.281 These authors make persuasive arguments in favor of the 
constitutional position. First, due process requires the exclusion of illegally 
obtained evidence because the fifth amendment prohibits the state from gaining 
an advantage over the criminal defendant through violation of his fundamental 
rights. 2H2 Second, the 'judicial review" argument equates illegally obtained evi-
dence with unconstitutional legislation. Just as a court must strike down an 
unconstitutional statute, a court must not sanction an unconstitutional act of the 
executive branch. 283 These positions are currently the subject of great debate. 284 
The fact that these constitutional arguments have not been persuasively refuted 
raises the profound question of whether the exclusive use of the deterrence 
principle would lead to the violation of constitutional rights of criminal defen-
dants. 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 1981). The Supreme Court has recently narrowed the defense of sovereign 
immunity to § 1983 actions. Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 
658 (1978); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980). See Seng, Municipal Liability for Police 
Misconduct, 51 MISS. L.J. I (1980). However, "good faith" on the part of the police officer continues to 
serve as a valid § 1983 defense. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980). 
277. See § V.C supra. • 
278. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914). The Court used the following words in that 
case to describe the constitutional necessity of the exclusionary rule: 
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a 
,itizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to 
be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are 
concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitition. 
[d. 
279. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
280. Katz, supra note 12, at 132·33. 
281. Sunderland, supra note 10, at 343 and authorities cited therein. 
282. [d. at 368-73. See also note 241 supra. 
283. Sunderland, supra note 10, at 373-75. 
284. See generally Katz, supra note 12, at 133 n.153; Sunderland, supra note 10. 
1983] EXCLUDING EVIDENCE TO PROTECT RiGHTS 167 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In both the United States and England, the exclusionary rule is presently 
subject to extensive criticism and sustained efforts to narrow or abolish the rule. 
These efforts have forcedjurists in both nations to develop theoretical principles 
to guide future development of the rule. The recently proposed changes in the 
English rule focus on application of the remedy to violations of basic rights. The 
United States Supreme Court, on the other hand, has advocated that the rule be 
applied only where it would deter illegal police conduct. 
The protective principle, if an appropriate principle to direct the English 
exclusionary rule, would be an even more appropriate principle to guide the 
development of the American rule. First, the protective principle, and not the 
deterrence principle, demands that courts protect basic individual liberties. 
Therefore, in the event that the Supreme Court finds the Constitution to require 
the exclusionary rule, a deterrence-based rule, which would be of narrow appli-
cation, could be held unconstitutional. A protective-based rule, on the other 
hand, would apply to fundamental rights and, therefore, would be constitution-
ally valid. Second, while the original purpose of the English exclusionary rule 
was to ensure the reliability of evidence, the Supreme Court developed the 
American rule as a remedy necessary to safeguard basic individual liberties. The 
protective principle would thus more accurately reflect those fundamental con-
siderations upon which the Supreme Court relied in establishing the rule over 
sixty years ago. Finally, the English authorities have encountered much difficulty 
in _determining which specific rights the exclusionary rule must protect. How-
ever, the Supreme Court would not face this same difficulty. The Bill of Rights 
clearly and specifically defines those basic liberties of which the protective prin-
ciple would demand exclusionary protection. 
There are many factors in the English legal system, therefore, that weigh 
against the decision to adopt the protective principle - the absence of a constitu-
tional exclusionary requirement, the history of the rule in that country and the 
difficulty in determining the rights to which to apply the English exclusionary 
rule. Yet, both the House of Lords and the Royal Commission unequivocally 
decided to adopt the protective principle. This Comment suggests that a strong 
belief that an effective remedy should enforce fundamental rights motivated its 
adoption. These same factors weigh in favor of an American adoption of the 
protective principle. Therefore, the protective principle should direct the devel-
opment of the American exclusionary rule in order to ensure that courts effec-
tively enforce fundamental rights. 
William R. Baldiga 
